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Stepping into the 60s: 
Tomas Kuhn’s intellectual turn towards the Philosophy of 
Science
Entrando en los 60’s: 
el giro intelectual de Thomas Kuhn hacia la filosofía de la ciencia
PABLO MELOGNO* Y AGUSTÍN COURTOISIE**
Abstract: In 1957 Kuhn publishes The Coper-
nican Revolution, and in 1962 The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions. Most commentators 
believe both works to be an expression of the 
same philosophical project. Against this interpre-
tation, we argue that there is a lack of continuity 
between both books, arising from the fact that 
between 1957 and 1958 Kuhn comes into con-
tact with the works of Hanson, Wittgenstein and 
Feyerabend, whose influence marks a break from 
his previous work. We also suggest that in 1957 
Kuhn applies a case-based historiography, and, 
in 1962, a structural historiography. We conclude 
that there is no relationship of continuity between 
Kuhn’s first two works.
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Resumen: En 1957 Kuhn publica The Coper-
nican Revolution, y en 1962 The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. La mayoría de los comen-
taristas considera ambas obras como expresión de 
un mismo proyecto filosófico. Contra esta inter-
pretación, defendemos que existe una disconti-
nuidad entre los dos libros. Esto responde a que 
entre 1957 y 1958 Kuhn entra en contacto con los 
trabajos de Hanson, Wittgenstein y Feyerabend, 
cuya influencia marca una ruptura con su trabajo 
previo. Proponemos también que en 1957 Kuhn 
maneja una historiografía casuística, y en 1962 
una historiografía estructural. Concluimos que 
no es posible pensar en términos de continuidad 
la relación entre las dos primeras obras de Kuhn 
Palabras clave: Thomas Kuhn, Historiografía, 
Revoluciones científicas, Revolución coperni-
cana, Historia de la Ciencia. 
1. Introduction1
In a recent work, Pietro Omodeo (2016), reconstructs the epistemological basis of Kuhn’s 
book The Copernican Revolution (1957) – hereinafter, CR- and of its influence on Kuhn’s 
later work. Omodeo believes that CR represents ‘the paradigm of paradigms’ at least in 
two senses. Firstly, the study of the Copernican revolution afforded Kuhn several historical 
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keys to coin concepts such as “paradigm” and “normal science”; secondly, the book may 
be regarded as a historical case representative of the philosophical ideas that will show up 
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) –hereinafter, SSR- which leads to believe 
that “Evidently, Copernican Revolution and Structure are the two sides of one and the same 
endeavor.” (Omodeo, 2016, 72)
This insight implies that Kuhn’s first two works are two expressions of a same philoso-
phical project, which started to take shape in the early 50s and developed without significant 
reworking at least up to the following decade: “As a matter of fact, Structure was preceded 
by a monograph on this crucial historical case, The Copernican Revolution (1957). Kuhn 
probably composed the two works in parallel. At least he had conceived them together.” 
(2016, 72) 
The idea of the existence of a relationship of continuity between CR and SSR has predo-
minated in the studies about Kuhn, partly encouraged by the statements of the author himself 
regarding his intellectual development. Works such as those by John Heilbron (1998), Noel 
Swerdlow (2004) and James Marcum (2005) have underlined that in the historical review of 
1957 we may already find seeds of the ideas that spring up in 1962, so that in the research on 
the Copernican revolution we may identify signs of the notion of paradigm and the incom-
mensurability thesis. Likewise, authors like Irzik (2001), González (2004) and Martínez 
Solano (2004) introduced a periodization of Kuhn’s work, the first stage of which ranges 
from the early 50s up to SSR “Postcript” in 1969, under the idea that this is a thematically and 
methodologically homogeneous period. Kuhn himself contributed to creating this image, by 
pointing out that SSR basic ideas have already been outlined before: “The essay that follows 
is the first full published report on a project originally conceived almost fifteen years ago” 
(1962, vii), in addition to several references made to CR as a case study that illustrates the 
nature of scientific revolutions as are described in SSR (1962, x, 69, 83, 117, 150).
However, after the publication of “Two cultures or one?: A second look at Kuhn’s the 
Copernican revolution” by Robert Westman in 1994, a line of interpretation takes shape, 
asserting that there are substantial differences between Kuhn’s two first books, that lead to 
conclude that Kuhn, in CR, starts from philosophical and historiographical assumptions that 
are incompatible with those adopted by him in the 60s2. This means that Kuhn’s thinking is 
significantly reoriented after CR was published (1957) and before publishing the SSR (1962), 
which largely explains the revolutionary nature of the latter. 
In previous works (author, 2015), we attempted to demonstrate that in 1957 Kuhn main-
tains a good deal of the philosophical matrix he will criticize in 1962. In our opinion, this 
explains the total absence of notions such as paradigm, normal science and incommensura-
bility in CR. Our purpose here is to clarify this process and account for the shift in Kuhn’s 
thinking from the late 50s to early 60s. In section 2 we discuss Kuhn’s insight presented by 
Omodeo, indicating that many of SSR main philosophic influences, including the works by 
N. R. Hanson, L. Wittgenstein and P. Feyerabend, only came to Kuhn’s attention after 1957. 
2 In a field different to the one tackled by us hereunder, yet as another attempt to indicate the lack of continuity in 
Kuhn’s thinking, it is proper to mention the paper by John Schuster who, in his review on The Essential Tension, 
pointed out substantial divergences between the notion of significant discovery, introduced by Kuhn in “The 
Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery”, 1961, and the SSR subsequent developments (Schuster, 1979, 
303-307).
25Stepping into the 60s: Tomas Kuhn’s intellectual turn towards the Philosophy of Science
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 76 (Enero-Abril) 2019
In section 3 we focus on the historiographical aspects of this process, and we affirm that, 
in CR, Kuhn starts from a case-based historiography, while in SSR he shifts to a structural 
historiography. In section 4 we uphold that this methodological difference extends to a 
difference in the domain of historical reconstruction, considering that RC bestows on several 
extra-scientific factors an explanatory role that is banned in SSR. Finally, we conclude that 
the differences identified between CR and SSR are sufficiently significant so as to deny a 
continuity between both works, while they reveal the important transformation that operates 
in Kuhn’s thinking between 1957 and 1962.
2. More than a change of decade
Based on the statement of Kuhn himself in SSR Preface, Omodeo underlines that CR 
and SSR were either 1) written in parallel, or else 2) conceived simultaneously. They are 
two hypotheses of a different interpretive status; the first refers to the chronology of Kuhn’s 
work, and, to a certain extent, it may be confirmed by studying documents and biographical 
information. The second is related to Kuhn’s intellectual process, and is far more difficult to 
confirm. If we check certain data on the production of both books we may shed some light 
on the matter, as well as on Kuhn’s intellectual process at the end of the 50s. 
Kuhn received his PhD from Harvard University in 1949. By this time he was already 
involved with James B. Conant -the President of the University-, teaching a series of science 
courses to Humanities students, in the General Education in Science syllabus. According 
to Kuhn, his work with Conant gives birth to the writing of CR3 as a course book, thus 
indicating that the drafting of the book started in 1949. Besides Kuhn, the teaching staff 
included Conant and the Chemist Leonard Nash, with whom Kuhn worked until 1956 – a 
year before CR was published- when he left for the University of California at Berkeley 
(Marcum, 2005). It may be gathered from the date of the preface (1957, x) that Kuhn had 
already finished the writing in November 1956 so, strictly speaking, the CR production 
period ranges from 1949 to 1956.
When the book comes to light in 1957 Kuhn is already in Berkeley, starting a period that 
will set the further course of his thinking. He gets acquainted with Paul Feyerabend, who in 
1958 was already immersed in an anti-empiricist crusade, through the release of “An attempt 
at a realistic interpretation of experience”, and with Stanley Cavell, who later introduces 
him to the work of Wittgenstein (Kindi, 1995; Gunnel; 2014). Yet, 1958 is a significant year 
not only for the release of Feyerabend’s seminal paper, but also for one of the books that 
will have the biggest influence on the writing of SSR: Patterns of Discovery, by Norwood 
Russell Hanson. As we all know, in SSR Kuhn relies on Hanson’s thesis, whereby obser-
vation is conditioned by a prior theoretical framework, so that two scientists with different 
conceptual frameworks see different things. The fact that Hanson’s book was written after 
CR not only reveals that one of Kuhn’s main philosophic influences appears just in 1958, 
but it also allows to understand the almost empiricist matrix that Kuhn manages in CR, 
where –as we have proven in (...)-, he subscribes without hesitation the theory that science 
3 “The book grows out of a series of lectures delivered each year since 1949 in one of the Science General 
Education courses at Harvard College...” (1957, 8).
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is constructed on an observational basis independent from the theories. Only after having 
read Hanson, Kuhn may assert that all observations are theory-dependent, based on which 
we may understand why the function of observation is so differently characterized in SSR 
as compared to CR. 
Similarly, in the 1958-1959 period there takes place the academic stay at the Center for 
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, California. This period at Stanford 
University will have a profound effect on Kuhn, as he becomes aware of the strong contrast 
between the work of social scientists and that of natural scientists, providing him with the 
raw material to formulate the notion of paradigm: 
I was struck by the number and extent of the overt disagreements between social 
scientists about the nature of legitimate scientific problems and methods. Both history 
and acquaintance made me doubt that practitioners of the natural sciences possess 
firmer or more permanent answers to such questions than their colleagues in social 
science. Yet, somehow, the practice of astronomy, physics, chemistry, or biology 
normally fails to evoke the controversies over fundamentals that today often seem 
endemic among, say, psychologists or sociologists. Attempting to discover the source 
of that difference led me to recognize the role in scientific research of what I have 
since called ‘paradigms’. (1962, viii) 
As we mentioned before, Kuhn states that his stage at Stanford coincides with “The final 
stage in the development of this essay…” (1962, vii), sustaining the idea that the process 
of writing the SSR dates back to the early 50s. However, since his arrival at Berkeley in 
1956 up to the publication of SSR in 1962, there is a series of facts that reveals that Kuhn’s 
intellectual path is being built brick over brick. The exchange with Feyerabend, the access 
to Wittgenstein’s works, the influential theory of Hanson’s insight, and the visit to Stanford 
lead Kuhn’s thinking along roads unknown to him, which flow into the SSR innovative 
formulations. 
The above does not in itself evidence that both works were not written at least partially 
in parallel; however, it allows to clearly establish that SSR key concepts only take a defined 
shape in 1958, two years after CR was finished. Therefore, we may not infer that both works 
were either written or conceived simultaneously, as the core concept of SSR is the result of 
the conceptual tools and philosophical influences acquired by Kuhn after the publication of 
CR. Below, we mention certain historiographical differences between both books, regarded 
as signs of the turn in Kuhn’s thinking by the end of the 50s.
3. The historiographical turn
Another element that has exacerbated the image of continuity between Kuhn’s first two 
books is that both are aimed at scientific revolutions. An apparently superficial difference 
is that, while CR is focused on a specific revolution, SSR deals with several revolutionary 
episodes. This alone does not constitute a significant divergence, yet it reveals that, in each 
case, Kuhn works under a different notion of scientific revolution, and under a different per-
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ception of the relations between history and philosophy of science. In this regard, Omodeo 
points out that Kuhn 
presented the relation between the two fields of investigation [history and philosophy 
of science] as a thematic overlapping, as an ‘interdisciplinary’ instead of ‘intra-
disciplinary’ relation. Copernicus was the author of one scientific upheaval, if seen 
from a historical perspective, but also the model revelatory of the structure of any 
scientific revolution, from the universalizing viewpoint of philosophy. (2016, 73)
It is true that, both in SSR and in later writings (1968, 1971, 1977), Kuhn explicitly 
tackled the relations between history and philosophy of science, as well as the historiogra-
phical implications of scientific revolutions; however, no such analysis may be found in 
1957 book. Inasmuch as CR is a strictly historical monograph, without specific resort to any 
philosophical thesis, you will hardly find in its pages the notion of the scientific revolutions 
as transhistorical structures that present different cases over time. The book is exclusively 
centered on the Copernican revolution, and it not only does not postulate inherent traits of 
any scientific revolution, but, quite to the contrary, it asserts scientific revolutions to be rather 
infrequent processes in the history of science.
Omodeo believes that “Copernicus was not just the protagonist of one among many 
revolutions. Rather, he became the symbol of the Scientific Revolution. As a consequence, 
Kuhn’s first book cannot be read, understood and criticized solely from the viewpoint of 
history. The Copernican Revolution is a point of departure for a correct assessment of his 
philosophy of science.” (2016, 73) Still, such a statement fails to take into account that, in 
1957, conditions were not yet appropriate to postulate a philosophy of science in Kuhn, or 
a consideration of the scientific revolutions under a clear philosophical agenda; this is the 
reason why SSR basic philosophical vocabulary -incommensurability, conversion, changes 
in Gestalt, paradigms, normal science- is completely absent in CR. 
Kuhn affirms in CR that the Copernican revolution reveals unique elements of scientific 
change, which may rarely be found in a few other cases such as those of Freud, Darwin 
or Einstein, and part of its uniqueness comes from its impact on different levels of social 
life: “In its extra-scientific consequences, however, the Copernican theory is not typical: 
few scientific theories have played so large a role in non-scientific thought.” (1957, 4). On 
the other hand, in SSR the domain of historical reconstruction is not defined by any given 
revolution, nor by a limited set of revolutions, but rather by a wide range of revolutionary 
events that follow the same structure. Based on this framework, Kuhn is able to formulate in 
SSR the thesis that scientific revolutions constitute a key mechanism for scientific progress; 
this assertion could not have been rendered under CR historiographical framework. 
As shown by Alexander Bird (2000), the above arises from the fact that, in CR, Kuhn 
makes history focused on a specific case, while in SSR he provides a ‘theoretical history’, 
oriented towards a general model of scientific revolutions. Bird attributes this to a difference 
of purposes as compared to CR, but we believe that there is a difference in the historiographi-
cal framework rather than in the approach only. The distinction introduced by Floris Cohen 
(1994) between the singular concept and the categorial concept of scientific revolution is 
helpful to clarify this issue. According to Cohen, the singular concept sees modern science 
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revolution as the revolution par excellence, and operates as a model for other revolutionary 
episodes. This, is the model followed, for example, by the book by Ernst Rupert Hall, The 
Scientific Revolution (1954), systematically quoted by Kuhn in CR and only once in SSR4. 
The categorial concept implies that ‘scientific revolution’ refers to a formal category 
rather than to a specific historical episode, so that the historical reconstruction is intended to 
establish the traits inherent to any scientific revolution. Based on this terminology, it may be 
asserted that in CR Kuhn manages a singular concept of scientific revolution, while in SSR 
he shifts towards the categorial concept, and therefore both books are not only separated by 
a matter of approach but rather by differences in the historiographical framework. 
Westman (1994) has illustrated such differences by asserting that, in CR, Kuhn manages 
a historical narrative, although not yet a historicist narrative. Noting the similarities among 
Cohen’s categorial notion of scientific revolution, Westman’s historicist narrative and Bird’s 
notion of theoretical history, we find that this issue may be more accurately formulated 
by indicating that, in CR, Kuhn starts from a case-based historiography, to the extent that 
the historical reconstruction of the Copernican revolution is an end in itself. Hence, the 
Copernican revolution as a singular episode -in Cohen’s sense- acts as a self-delimited unit, 
insofar as the outcomes of historical narrative apply almost exclusively to the case defined 
as domain of analysis.
In turn, in SSR Kuhn operates under a structural historiography, considering that the 
singular revolutions act as cases that provide the raw material for a much more far- reaching 
philosophical mechanism aimed at revealing certain structural traits of the revolutionary 
change. At this time, the historiographical turn in Kuhn’s thinking represents a shift from 
the methodology whereby each scientific revolution is an object of analysis in its own right, 
towards a very different conception that states that the study of each scientific revolution 
reveals a structure shared by them all. Thus, a change in the methodological approach brings 
a change in the unit of analysis of historical reconstruction, marking the turning point from 
casuistical historiography to case-based historiography. 
4. The historian and the philosopher
So far, we have provided some adverse comments to Omodeo’s insight (2016) –with 
reference to his antecedents in Heilbron (1998), Swerdlow (2004), Marcum (2005)- about 
the leading role of such an early work as CR in a general overview of Kuhn’s production. In 
fact, it may not be reasonably asserted that CR is a preceding event to SSR in chronological 
terms only and not in substance. Besides, it is also proper to inquire whether his investiga-
tions have not suffered increasingly deeper changes over time that drove him away from 
his initial approaches.
In this section we will delve into some other elements of Kuhn’s later work, that drive 
him further away from CR. In this regard, we will take as reference the postulation of a 
linguistic turn in the works subsequent to SSR, thematized by Irzik and Grünberg (1998), 
Gattei (2008), Gentile (2013) and Marcum (2015), among others. Initially, we come across 
4 This is an indicator of a change in the content and in the categorial status of the concept of scientific revolution 
in 1962 compared to 1957. 
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CR methodological approach: open, interdisciplinary, permeable to multiple experiences: 
“Though the Revolution’s name is singular, the event was plural. Its core was a transforma-
tion of mathematical astronomy, but it embraced conceptual changes in cosmology, physics, 
philosophy, and religion as well” (1957, vii). Its amplitude is perceived, for example, by 
the reference made to the voyages that widened the horizons of Renaissance man: “…the 
Atlantic voyages which widened the terrestrial horizons of Renaissance man” (1957, vii). 
It may be inferred that the attention paid to the science-society relationship and to the 
extra-scientific factors arises from the influence of J. B. Conant (1947). Conant believed 
science development to be an activity regulated by social structures, and therefore he thought 
essential to study the relationship between scientific theories and the ideas –political, reli-
gious, philosophical- prevailing in each era5. 
It is worth mentioning the outstanding role that the CR confers upon certain historical 
figures, mostly religious authorities, indissolubly linked to the emergence of a new con-
cept of Universe. About the words of cardinal Bellarmino –who will condemn Copernican 
viewpoints one year later- “But as for myself, I shall not believe that there are such proof 
until they are shown to me” (in Kuhn, 1957, 198), Kuhn reflects “We may wonder what 
sort of evidence Bellarmino would have considered ‘real proof’ against the literal word of 
Scripture” (ibidem). As to Giordano Bruno, qualified in CR as an “Italian mystic” (1957, 
235), Kuhn states that the fundamentalism of the Inquisition came from the religious realm 
and had strong social and political consequences, which pierced through the scientific 
development:
Bruno was not executed for Copernicanism, but for a series of theological heresies 
centering in his view of the Trinity, heresies for which Catholics had been executed 
before. He is not, as he has often been called, a martyr of science. But Bruno had 
found Copernicus’ proposal congenial to his Neoplatonic and Democritean vision 
of an infinite universe containing infinity worlds generated by a fecund deity… 
Certainly the Church feared Bruno’s Copernicanism, and that fear may also have 
stimulated their reaction. (Kuhn, 1957, 199)
Likewise, weaving the same dialectical braid of precedents, polemical opposites and 
processes aligned with the new conception of the Universe, CR introduces other figures of 
history and culture from different periods: an extensive quote of Plato’s Timaeus, “an allego-
rical story of the creation in which the universe appears as an organism, an animal” (28-29); 
references to the neoplatonic Nicholas of Cusa (233); comments on Dante, the Italian poet, 
and its Divine Comedy (112-114); quotes of Melanchton, “Luther’s principal lieutenant, 
soon joined in the increasing Protestant clamor against Copernicus” (191); thoughts of poets 
John Donne and John Milton (194-195); elucidations on Andreas Osiander, “the Lutheran 
theologian who saw Copernicus’ manuscript through the press”, who wrote the anonymous 
preface of De Revolutionibus without Copernicus permission (187), together with other 
figures of the political, religious, literary and philosophical fields.
5 An interest account of Conant’s influence over Kuhn may be found in Pacheco (2011). 
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The contrast of all this historical openness in CR is extremely shocking if we turn to 
analyze SSR. We start by describing certain different trends: the mention to B.L. Whorf in 
the Preface6, or the reference to Wittgenstein’s language games (Kuhn, 1962, 45-46). We 
are far from the broadmindedness of the Renaissance man crossing the Atlantic, which has 
been restricted to a consideration of scientific communities by and faced to themselves. 
As the 60s come to an end, and Kuhn’s philosophical interests forged ahead of his 
vocation as a historian, the attention to certain details, and the almost Darwinian importance 
given to specialization, generates a longing for a particular harmony of disparate elements, 
a certain generous spaciousness that was present in CR. On the other hand, in SSR we may 
find observations such as: “In many environments a group that could not tell wolves from 
dogs could not endure. Nor would a group of nuclear physicist today survive as scientists if 
unable to recognize the tracks of alpha particles and electrons” (opus cit., 195-196).
Omodeo acknowledges this in pointing out that 
In the Structure no technical or practical aspects significantly account for the histo-
rical development of science. The economical basis is completely absent. Thus, the 
structure underlying science has nothing to do with the socio-economical basis. It is 
rather a conceptual framework. (2016, 86) 
It is precisely the consideration of the ‘socio-economical basis’ of science that marks 
another significant different between both Kuhn’s works, as the diagnosis of exclusion of 
technical factors and the socio-economic influences may only be fairly attributed to SSR 
rather than to CR. 
In Kuhn’s later writings this trend will continue to rise, paying more and more attention 
to the inner workings of science and to the semantic and ontological issues of scientific lan-
guage, and giving less importance to the history of science. The above marks the abandon-
ment of the open and plural program of the history of science that CR puts forward, for the 
sake of deepening in other issues such as the theories of truth and the relationship between 
the language and the world. Without diminishing the importance of such dimension, several 
critics observed with disappointment how Kuhn, after SSR, shifts towards linguistic matters, 
deflating the attractive historical dimension that made his work famous: 
While he previously told us about sociology of science projects, computer programs, 
there seems to have occurred a progressive displacement towards language-centered 
issues … the question arises as to whether we have lost a historian, we have lost 
Kuhn for the history of science. (Beltrán in Kuhn, 1987, 52-53)
In CR Kuhn tried to give an account of the different levels of interaction between science 
and extra-scientific factors, including social practices, philosophical systems or religious 
beliefs, on the premise that they play a key role in the explanation of scientific revolutions. 
Instead, in SSR the domain of the historiographical reconstruction is restricted to the scien-
tific ideas and practices, inasmuch as the notions of paradigm and normal science embody 
6 An interesting review about Whorf’s influence on Kuhn’s work may be found in Irzik and Grünberg (1998). 
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scientific communities as self-sufficient historical entities, whose working dynamics may 
be understood without resorting to external elements. Thus, the methodological differences 
we found between CR and SSR are added to the domain differences between both works, 
given that the first upholds the inclusion of extra-scientific factors in historical narrative, in 
a way that is implicitly eradicated in the second. 
5. Conclusions 
Both, the retrospective image offered by Kuhn himself on the intellectual development 
and the reconstructions of his followers fuelled the idea that the publication of SSR is the 
end of a project that dates back at least to the early 50s, and that reaches, seamlessly, to the 
year 1962. In these conditions, the publication of CR is usually regarded as a preceding event 
to the well-known theses presented by Kuhn in 1962, and as a case study that illustrates 
the philosophical matrix that takes shape in SSR. Against this widespread viewpoint, we 
have tried to argue that the relationship between Kuhn’s two books may not be determined 
in terms of continuity, not only because most SSR basic terminology is absent in CR, but 
also because, in the time elapsed between publication of the two books, Kuhn receives and 
processes a series of influences which will be crucial to his changes of approach in the 
beginning of the 60s. 
The encounter with Wittgenstein’s studies of language and N. R. Hanson’s theory of 
perception, the exchange with Feyerabend, and his stay at Stanford University, all of which 
took place after CR, account for most of the interests and the theses advanced by Kuhn 
from SSR, which were totally non-existent in his study on the Copernican revolution. Here, 
Kuhn merely provides a strictly historical narrative on a specific revolution of the history of 
science, yet without drawing the philosophical consequences that will influence his future 
way of thinking. We have tried to demonstrate that this difference between what we call 
case-based historiography and a structural historiography arises from the fact that, in 1957, 
the philosophical mechanism developed by Kuhn in 1962 is yet far from maturing, partly 
because Kuhn remains firmly committed to certain notions of the traditional philosophy of 
science, and partly because he still had not processed many of the main influences that will 
nourish his mature work.
As we see it, this type of comprehension of Kuhn’s thinking prior to SSR is essential 
to understand the genesis and development of one of the most important philosophers of 
the 20th century, whose work prior to 1962 has frequently been overlooked or subsumed 
to a preliminary chapter of SSR. Insofar as we may come further closer to young Kuhn, the 
science historian, we will surely acquire better interpretative tools to understand the rest of 
his work.
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